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VALID CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT:
NEED THE PATIENT KNOW?
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent,
commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.'
V.

The law does not insist that a surgeon shall perform every operation according to plans and specifications approved in advance
by the patient, and carefully tucked away in his office safe for
courtroom purposes.2
INTRODUCTION
There are many legal implications, not the least being the issue of informed consent, inherent in the consensual relationship of physician and
patient.' It is generally agreed that a physician must obtain the patient's
consent before proceeding with treatment; 4 otherwise he subjects himself
to the risk of liability for malpractice5 or assault and battery. 6 Consent
to treatment need not be express, but can be either implied from the facts
arising from the contacts and dealings between physician and patient,'
or implied by law as in emergency situations.8 However, another issue
that must be resolved is the validity of consent to medical or surgical
treatment. More specifically, can any consent to treatment, whether express or implied, constitute valid authorization to the physician unless
the patient understands the scope and extent of his consent?
This question will be considered in that situation where a normal adult
patient confronts a physician, requesting consultation, advice and treat1.
(1914).
2.
3.
4.

Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626, 628 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1943).
Russell v. Harwick, 166 So. 2d 904 (Fla. App. 1964).
See HAYT, HAYT & GROESCHEL, LAW OF HOSPITAL, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 253 (2d

ed. 1952); SHARTEL & PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE § 1-05 (1959); HosPiTAL LAW

Consents I (1959); McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical
Treatment, 41 MNq. L. REV. 381 (1957); Smith, Antecedent Grounds for Liability in the
Practice of Surgery, 14 RocKY MT. L. REV. 233 (1942); Comment, 29 ALBANY L. REV. 342
(1965).
5. See e.g. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670
(1960); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. App. 1966).
6. See e.g. Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958);
McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINNp. L. REv.
381,392 (1957).
.7. E.g. O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co., 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891); McGuire
v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929).
8. E.g. Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); Jackovach v. Yocom, 212
Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931).
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ment. In those physician-patient relationships involving an emergency, a
minor patient, or a patient that is non compos mentis, the question of
whether the patient understands what the physician intends to do is
irrelevant since in these instances the patient is either unable or deemed
incapable of granting consent.' Therefore, the patient must be suffiiently
capable of exercising his powers of judgment and choice before the issue
of informed consent becomes meaningful.
The legal standards for ascertaining whether informed consent has been
given are in some conflict; the application of the various rules are not
consistent; and the total result is uncertainty for both the physician and
patient. Further, revised legal standards as well as increased guidance to
physicians by legal counsel can accomplish at least a partial solution to
the problem.
THE NATURE OF INFORMED CONSENT
If it is first accepted that one has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body, and can either accept or refuse medical or surgical treatment, it would apparently follow that such a choice could be
deemed valid only when the person has sufficient understanding of the
considerations involved to make an intelligent choice.' ° If that choice is
to submit to treatment and the physician is authorized by the patient to
commence treatment, it can be said that the patient gave his informed
consent to be treated. Informed consent may then be defined as authorization to proceed with treatment given to a physician by a patient who
knows and understands the risks and consequences that the treatment
entails.
It is generally understood that a physician has a duty to disclose to
his patient the results of diagnosis and the risks and consequences involved in proposed treatment." However, a physician is apt to be somewhat concerned about the extent of disclosure he must make. Several cases
occurring within the past few years, in a single jurisdiction, serve to
illustrate that the physician's concern is well founded.
In 1958, in Zaretsky v. Jacobson,2 the Third District Court of Appeals
9. In Littlejohn v. Arbogast, 95 Ill. App. 605 (1901), and Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark.
601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907), consent was held to be implied in law when it was impractical
to consult relatives of adult patients who were unable to give consent and there was an
imminent threat to life or health. In Luka v. Lowrie, and Jackovach v. Yocom, supra note
8, the patients were minors whose parents could not be contacted and there was an imminent
threat to life or health. For a case that considered collaterally the problem of obtaining
consent in a situation where the patient was insane, see Pratt v. Davis, 224 I1. 300, 79 N.E.
562 (1906).
10. Natanson v. Kline, supra note 5, at 1104.
11. 41 Am. JuR. Physicians and Surgeons § 73 (1942); SnARaE.L & PLANT, THE LAW OF
MFICAL PRACTICE § 1-05 (1959).

12. 99 So. 2d 730 (Fla. App. 1958).

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:450

of Florida held that a patient, injured as the result of a surgical procedure
called an aortagram, stated a cause of action by alleging that he had not
consented to such a highly technical and dangerous operation. In the
Zaretsky case the court relied on established precedent that a doctor could
not ophrate without express or implied consent, or in a manner contrary
to the patient's expressed instructions."3 The patient voluntarily submitted

to an operation, but apparently the court did not consider this submission
as constituting implied consent to the aortagram.
Five years later the same court, in Bowers v. Talmage,"4 considered
the complaint of parents whose nine year old son suffered partial paralysis
as a result of an arteriogram. The parents alleged that the arteriogram
was a dangerous procedure and that the consent they extended for the
procedure was not informed consent and was therefore invalid. The court
held that the physician is under a duty to adequately inform the patient
or, as in this case, the parents of a minor patient, of all the dangers inherent in an operation. There was no evidence that the parents were
informed of the dangers incident to an arteriogram. The court relied upon
the Zaretsky case and Woods v. Brumlop' 5 in concluding that unless a
person giving consent to an operation knows of the degree of danger t] e
consent is invalid.

In 1964, this court was again called upon to decide whether the patient
had given informed consent. In Russell v. Harwick, 6 damages totaling
$100,000 were awarded to the patient and her husband upon a finding
that the surgeon had not told her that as a result of the necessary operative procedure her injured leg would be somewhat shorter than her healthy
leg. The patient testified that she relied upon the surgeon to do whatever
was necessary to relieve her condition, and it was established that the
procedure finally adopted by the physician followed unsuccessful attempts
to manipulate the injured hip in an alternative manner. Expert witnesses
testified that the final procedure was warranted under the circumstances,
was a well known and accepted procedure, and was skillfully performed.
However, the patient testified that had she known that a shortening of
her leg would result she would have requested further consultation before
submitting to the operation. This testimony was sufficient for the court
to conclude that the jury could have found there was no informed consent.
In 1966, the same court, in Ditlow v. Kaplan, 7 affirmed a judgment
for a physician upon the grounds that the plaintiff-patient had failed to
show that it was accepted practice in the community for gastroenterol13. Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716 (Fla. App. 1957); Wal v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478
(5th Cir. 1943).
14. Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1963).
15. 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
16. Supra note 3.
17. Ditlow v. Kaplan, supra note 5.
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ogists and physicians to advise their patients that perforation of the
esophagus was a risk inherent in a gastroscopic procedure. In this case
the patient had knowledge that the procedure involved some risk, but
was not informed of the possibility that her esophagus could be punctured.
The court recognized Bowers v. Talmage'8 as precedent requiring the
physician to adequately inform the patient of dangers inherent in an
operation, but held that the standard to be applied in ascertaining
whether the physician had fulfilled his duty was the accepted practice of
other physicians in the community. In requiring that proof of the community standard be provided through expert witnesses before recovery
would be allowed, the court relied upon recent cases from Delaware, 9
Kansas,2 ° Michigan"' and Wyoming. 2 Therefore, it would appear that
the Third District Court of Appeals of Florida has come full circle between Bowers v. Talmage in 1963 and Ditlow v. Kaplan in 1966. In
Bowers the court said, "unless a person who gives consent to an operation
knows its dangers and the degree of danger, a 'consent' does not represent
a choice and is ineffectual."2 3 The subjective nature of this test for informed consent appears to be quite different from the "community standard" applied by the Ditlow court. A court, in applying the subjective
standard of Bowers, must find that the patient knew the risks and consequences of the treatment and intelligently consented to such treatment,
or else that the patient did not want to know, or waived disclosure in
consenting to treatment. This finding is not the same as that required
in Ditlow. The Ditlow test would merely require the physician to show
that he disclosed, to his patient, substantially the same information as do
other physicians under similar circumstances. When the latter standard
is used, there is no real requirement that the patient be able to make an
intelligent decision based upon substantial information of alternative
choices. Consent in this instance merely means that the patient must
decide whether to accept treatment upon the basis of what is disclosed by
the physician, whether this information is sufficient grounds for an intelligent decision or not.
The fact that the four cases previously discussed have a common jurisdiction is not intended as an indication that the problem is in any way
limited to that jurisdiction. On the contrary, the question of informed
consent has arisen in a substantial number of states and has been decided
in a variety of ways. By far the majority of jurisdictions treat the issue
as incident to malpractice.2 4 However, the issue of informed consent has
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Supra note 14.
DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963).
Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963).
Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1962).
159 So. 2d at 889.
See e.g. Ditlow v. Kaplan, supra note 5; Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965);
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also arisen in actions for assault and battery,25 lack of consent, 6 and a
combination malpractice-battery suit.2 There are various standards applied in the several jurisdictions that in some ways conflict with, and to
some extent complement, each other.
For example, a number of jurisdictions allow a patient to maintain a
malpractice suit against a physician based upon the physician's failure to
make a reasonable disclosure of dangers incident to the proposed treatment without the use of expert testimony to establish the "community
standard" of disclosure. Thus, in a New York case,2 8 a patient inflicted
with rheumatoid arthritis was treated with injections of a gold compound
that caused her to suffer from a skin condition. The court held that the
possibility of causing the skin condition is a known danger incident to
use of the gold compound and should have been brought to the attention
of the patient before using it. While the court found that the possibility
of undesirable reactions is recognized by the medical profession, it did
not require evidence to establish that the danger would be normally communicated to patients by other members of the profession under like
circumstances. Similarly, in Woods v. Brumlop,29 a case involving consent
to electroshock therapy, the court held that the relationship between
physician and patient is one of trust and confidence requiring the physician to make a full and frank disclosure to the patient of all pertinent
facts relative to the illness and the prescribed treatment. The court stated
that the real reason for requiring disclosure is to give the patient a foundation upon which to base his decision. In this case, as in the former, no
expert testimony was required.
Significantly, the prior two cases were malpractice suits in which the
community standard of the medical profession was regarded as the norm.
Establishing the community standard usually requires expert testimony.8 '
However, there does appear to be some basis for dispensing with the
requirement, as in these cases, where the nature of the wrong termed
malpractice is not negligence or breach of professional ethics, but, rather,
a wrong dependent upon considerations relating to whether the patient was
DiRosse v. Wein, 24 App. Div. 2d 510, 261 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1965); Block v. McVay, 80 S.D.
469, 126 N.W.2d 808 (1964); Williams v. Menehan, supra note 20; Woods v. Brumlop, 71
N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962); Govin v. Hunter, supra note 22; DiFilippo v. Preston, supra
note 19; Klien v. Arnold, 203 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
25. Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, supra note 6.
26. Wilson v. Lehman, 379 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1964).
27. Bradford v. Winter, 215 Cal. App. 2d 448, 30 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1963).
28. DiRosse v. Wein, supra note 24. See also Scott v. Kaye, App. Div. 2d
264 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1965).
29. Woods v. Brumlop, supra note 24.
30. Id. at 524.
31. See 20 Am. JuR. Evidence §§ 775 et seq. (1942) ; 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons
§ 62 (1951).
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informed to an extent necessary to enable him to make an intelligent
decision.
Also, in this area, expert testimony need not be considered in an action
for assault and battery. Thus, an allegation that the patient had not been
informed that a prostate gland operation would involve severance of his
spermatic cords was held to constitute assault and battery. 2 It was held
that where the surgeon can ascertain alternative situations in advance of
an operation, and no emergency exists, the patient must be informed of
the possibilities and permitted to decide for himself.
As previously stated, however, the majority of jurisdictions do require
expert testimony where the issue is informed consent. The purpose of such
testimony is to establish the standard of reasonable practice for a physician or specialist under similar circumstances. A leading case among jurisdictions accepting this procedure is Natanson v. Kline,33 which involved
a patient who sustained serious injury due to an excessive dose of cobalt
irradiation therapy. The physician had made no disclosure of the dangers
involved in such treatment and the court, reversing judgment for the
physician, stated:
In our opinion the proper rule of law to determine whether a
patient has given an intelligent consent to a proposed form of
treatment by a physician ...

compels disclosure by the physi-

cian in order to assure that an informed consent of the patient
is obtained. The duty of the physician to disclose, however, is
limited to those disclosures which a reasonably prudent medical
would make under the same or similar circumpractitioner
4
stances.

3

The language in the Natanson opinion seems to indicate the disclosure is
mandatory and must substantially conform to disclosures that would be
made by other members of the medical profession under similar circumstances. This is the standard for determining adequate disclosure. Such a
standard relied heavily upon the medical profession's recognition of its
obligations to maintain adequate criteria for disclosure. Measuring the
sufficiency of disclosure in these terms makes the patient entirely dependent upon the medical profession for protection of his right to be informed.
In essence, the profession determines what a patient is to be told. However, the court apparently considered the interests of the patient sufficient
to warrant laying down guidelines for the medical profession. In discussing the extent of information that must be disclosed to the patient the
court stated:
32. Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, supra note 6.

33. Supra note 5.
34. Natanson v. Kline, supra note 5, at 1106.
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In considering the obligations of a physician to disclose and
explain to the patient in language as simple as necessary the
nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the
probability of success or of alternatives, and perhaps the risks
of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the
body, we do not think the administration of such an obligation,
by imposing liability for malpractice if the treatment were administered without such explanation where explanation could
reasonably be made, presents any insurmountable obstacles."
The court in Natanson relied to some extent upon Slago v. Leland
Stanford, Etc. Bd. Trustees,3 6 which involved a patient who suffered
partial paralysis as a result of a procedure known as an aortography. The
patient alleged that neither the details of the procedure nor its dangers
were explained to him. The trial court gave instructions to the effect that
the physician has a duty to disclose all facts that mutually affect his and
the patient's rights and interests as well as the surgical risks, hazards and
dangers involved. On appeal the court held that the instructions were too
broad and stated:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself
to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form
the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment. Likewise the physician may not minimize the known
dangers of a procedure of operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the same time, the physician must place the
welfare of his patient above all else and this very fact places him
in a position in which he sometimes must choose between two
alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the patient
every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation,
no matter how remote; this may well result in alarming a patient
who is to undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal
risk; it may also result in actually increasing the risks by reason
of the physiological results of the apprehension itself. The
problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is
important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must
be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent. 7
The position of the Kansas and California courts affords recognition
to the right of the patient to have information enabling him to decide
between accepting treatment and its risks or suffering the consequences
35. Natanson v. Kline, supra note 5, at 1106-1107.
36. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1958).
37. Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
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of his ailment. Yet the courts appear to feel that what the patient should
be told is a matter for medical opinion. Thus, there appears to be a
willingness on the part of the courts to permit the physicians a certain
amount of discretion in deciding the nature and content of the disclosures.
Somewhat more removed from the theory of absolute duty to disclose
the risks and consequences of treatment are those courts requiring that
the patient provide expert testimony to establish the nature of the disclosure customarily made by the medical profession in warning of certain
dangers inherent in the operation or treatment that the patient has undergone."' For example, Govin v. Hunter 9 involved an action for damages
based upon malpractice. The patient alleged that the physician failed to
fully disclose the number of incisions required to successfully complete
the operation. As a result of the operation the patient's leg was scarred
and disfigured. Thus it was alleged that the physician breached a duty
in not informing the patient that multiple incisions would be necessary to
complete the operation, thereby depriving her of the right to decide
whether she would submit to such an operation. The court held that the
custom of the medical profession must be established by expert testimony.
Furthermore, unless there is expert testimony, the want of care necessary
for liability for malpractice could not be decided by a jury, since, without
expert testimony there would be no basis for finding that a duty had been
breached.
The rules relied on by courts in deciding whether authorization for
treatment is valid (based upon informed consent) may be summarized
as including three general standards. (1) The jurisdictions that follow the
reasoning of the DiRosse and Woods cases apply the "subjective" test.
They rely on the nature of the risks and consequences inherent in specific
surgical or medical treatment, and concern themselves with determining
whether the individual patient was sufficiently apprised of the risks.
(2) The second group of courts accept the premise that a physician has a
duty to make a disclosure that enables the patient to give informed
consent. They require the patient to produce medical testimony that
establishes what disclosures are reasonable in light of community medical
practice. The courts do not, however, stop here. As illustrated by the
Natanson and Slago cases, there are minimum limits placed upon the
medical profession. More specifically, the courts describe the nature of
the disclosures that should be made and rely on the medical profession to
police themselves in fulfilling the obligations owed to patients. (3) The
third group of cases apply a more liberal standard. While requiring disclosure and informed consent to treatment, they hold that before the
38. DiFilippo v. Preston, supra note 19; Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181
N.E.2d 562 (1962); Govin v. Hunter, supra note 22; Aiken v. Clary, supra note 24; Ditlow
v. Kaplan, supra note 5.
39. Supra note 22.
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patient can recover damages for malpractice arising from the physician's
failure to make an adequate disclosure, the patient must show that the
physician did not meet the standard of practice of other physicians in the
community. Using this standard, the courts place full reliance upon the
medical profession and its ability to protect the patient's right to an
adequate disclosure.
DEFECTS IN THE PRESENT STANDARDS
Each of the three standards has a defect that causes some uncertainty
in the guidelines it furnishes the physician or surgeon. The subjective
test appears to provide the greatest assurance that the right of the individual patient to be informed will be protected by the courts. In practical
application, however, it constitutes an impossible standard of conduct for
a physician or surgeon. It requires that the physician sufficiently apprise
each individual patient of the possible risks and consequences of proposed
treatment, in a manner that will assure the patient's ability to intelligently
determine whether to submit to treatment. This standard can be applied
in a manner that would require the physician to be able to detect the
slightest misunderstanding on the part of his patient. A uniform application of such a standard may very well have the effect, contemplated by
at least one court, of causing the physician to defer exercise of professional
40
discretion during the course of treatment.
The third standard, which depends solely upon expert testimony, has
the opposite effect upon the physician-patient relationship. It encourages
exercise of discretion on the part of the medical profession. Thus, it permits the various segments of the medical community to establish their own
standard for patient disclosures. This criterion can prevent the physician
from telling the patient anything that may cause him to become apprehensive. Instead of fostering trust and confidence between physician and
patient, such a standard may have the opposite effect. By ignoring the
individual patient, it may foster distrust of the medical profession by the
general public.
The test outlined in the Natanson case appears to be the most satisfactory of the three approaches. It requires disclosure of a definite nature and
at the same time relies to a great extent upon the medical profession's
integrity. However, the standard can be applied to have the same effect
as the test based entirely upon the testimony of expert witnesses. 4
Additional inconsistency in the standards for establishing informed
consent exists in this area. The basic problem of informed consent should
40. See Barnett v. Bachrach, supra note 2.
41. See Ditlow v. Kaplan, supra note 5, where the court cites the Natanson case and
yet appears to require expert testimony to establish a standard for disclosure without limiting
such standard as did the court in the Natanson case.
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be treated on an individual patient basis since the issue necessarily involves a determination of whether a particular patient was sufficiently
apprised of the nature of treatment to understand, in a general way, what
his consent involved. The issue does not involve negligence on the part of
the physician, for, in many of the cases allowing recovery, the procedures
were skillfully accomplished and acceptable to the medical profession.4"
Also, because of the wide cross-section of persons who may be patients,
it seems highly unlikely that any rigid standard for disclosure among the
medical community would insure that the less educated person would
understand the nature of the proposed treatment. The requirement of
medical testimony to establish a standard of disclosure, therefore, seems
inappropriate in determining the issue of informed consent and differs
substantially from the issue of standard of care in executing a surgical
procedure or prescribing a drug.
Another matter of some importance is the extent of disclosure that must
be made. Of what risks and consequences must the patient be apprised?
The subjective standard would require that this matter depend upon the
capacity of the individual patient to appreciate the comparison of minute
risks and unlikely consequences. The Ditlow standard would allow the
medical community to determine what incidence of risks and probability
of consequences were of sufficient magnitude to be called to the attention
of the patient. Both standards are somewhat uncertain to the individual
physician. Perhaps the most practical standard is that enunciated in the
Slago case. While allowing the physician a wide latitude of discretion in
how he should undertake the education of his patient, that standard, nonetheless, requires him to make available to the patient any facts that are
necessary for an intelligent consent and prohibits him from minimizing
proven dangers in treatment.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A REVISED STANDARD
The following comments are proposals for a revised standard to be
used in determining the issue of informed consent to medical and surgical
treatment.
First, the rule stated in the earlier cases concerned with consent to
surgical procedures 3 and its modification by several recent cases that are
more specifically involved with informed consent to treatment 44 recognizes
that every normal adult has a right to decide whether he will submit his
body to proposed medical or surgical treatment. Before voluntary submission to treatment will be deemed to constitute valid consent, he must
42. E.g. Russell v. Harwick, supra note 3.
43. See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Rolater v. Strain, 39
Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96 (1913); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125,
105 N.E. 92 (1914).
44. See e.g. Slago v. Leland Stanford, Etc. Bd. Trustees, supra note 36.
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be apprised of any facts that are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent to proposed treatment.
The object of using expert testimony should be to establish those risks
and consequences that are incident to a specific procedure or treatment.
While there are general risks of infection, death and impairment of
mobility of body parts inherent in any operation, it is uniquely within the
ability of the medical profession and its specialties to relate specific risks
or consequences to a proposed method of treatment, and to inform the
jury and the court of the probability that a specific risk or consequence
will result from a certain procedure. This testimony would allow a jury
of laymen to arrive at the magnitude of the risk by correlating the nature
of the risk or consequence to the probability of its occurrence. Thus, it
may be said that a consequence, such as shortening of a limb, which will
almost certainly follow a specific procedure, would be a risk of sufficient
magnitude to compel disclosure,4 5 while the disclosure of the risk of perforating the esophagus during an exploratory operation; since it is a rather
rare occurrence and of slight consequence, would be excused.46 Although
such a test would allow the jury some latitude in determining whether disclosure of a particular aspect of treatment was to be compelled, it would
seem that this test would afford the physician a more concrete basis for
determining the content of the disclosure than the subjective test, while
simultaneously guaranteeing that the patient will be told matters that are
of reasonable significance.
It should not be necessary for the physician to describe every facet of
an operative procedure to the patient. The subject of disclosure should
parallel that outline set forth in the Natanson case, including the general
nature of proposed treatment, probability of success, alternative procedures, general risks and probably consequences, and the possibility that
unforeseen conditions may necessitate a change in procedure not contemplated at the outset. Such disclosure, when made in a manner that best
suits the individual patient, can assure the physician that the patient has
placed his trust in the physician's ability and should also enable the
physician to obtain valid consent authorizing him to perform both the
contemplated operation and any unforeseen operative procedures that may
materialize during the course of the primary procedure.
Courts must be aware of the physician's need to use general rather than
technical or specific explanations. This generality is required for two
reasons: first, because of the inability of the average person to comprehend
the exact nature of medical and surgical treatment, and also because use of
general terms will enable a physician to arouse the patient's awareness
that certain procedures involve a substantial amount of danger without
45. See Russell v. Harwick, supra note 3.
46. See Diflow v. Kaplan, supra note 5.
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having to detail every possible result, thereby causing the patient to
become unnerved at the thought of the procedure.
Another aspect of the physician-patient relationship that must be considered is the need for the patient to derive the greatest amount of therapeutic benefit possible. The court should recognize that the physician may
be excused from making a full and frank disclosure to an unduly apprehensive patient.4 7 However, since this condition would be an exception to
the requirement of disclosure, the burden should fall upon the physician to
prove that limited disclosure was warranted under the circumstances.
A standard incorporating the above proposals would allow a jury to
determine whether the patient was sufficiently informed to give an effective consent to a specific treatment. In effect, the subjective standard
would be retained in that the jury would have to determine whether the
individual patient was made aware of a sufficient number of facts to make
an intelligent decision. Yet, the uncertainty inherent in the standard as
applied in DiRosse and Bang4 8 would to some extent be cured by requiring
expert testimony to establish the magnitude of the risk or consequence
that allegedly was not communicated to the patient. In addition, the
illogical requirement of expert testimony to establish a standard of care
would be unnecessary. This procedure should help preserve the attention
given to the individual on a patient by patient basis, and at the same time
eliminate the disregard for individual traits of patients in order to preserve
the freedom of judgment in the medical profession.
CONCLUSION
The instability of presently established standards for determining the
issue of informed consent is indicated by the changes that occurred in
Florida within a relatively short period of time. A great number of states
have similar rules, and in those states that apply different standards there
is need for revision because of the uncertainty that is created by the
practical application of such rules to the physician-patient relationship.
The requirement of expert testimony to establish a standard of practice
is somewhat out of place even though the majority of informed consent
issues arise in malpractice suits. The issue itself is basically individual in
nature and, in the interest of logically resolving the issue in a manner that
affords recognition to the wide cross-section of patients, expert testimony
should be used to establish the nature of treatment in the context of the
magnitude of risks and consequences incident to specific treatment. Such
a test would best serve the interests of the physician and the patient, for
47. See e.g. Dicenzo v. Berg, 340 Pa. 305, 16 A.2d 15 (1940) ; Natanson v. Kline, supra
note 5; Slago v. Leland Stanford, Etc. Bd. Trustees, supra note 36.
48. Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, supra note 6.
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it would afford the physician a more concrete basis for determining content of disclosure and at the same time take into account the needs of the
individual patient.
Charles J. Weyandt

